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Owens

DISCUSS

No. 73-717

Views of the SG

Antoine v. Washington
The SG says that the 1891 agreement was ratified by
Congress and thus became binding on the state by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause.

--

Therefore, under Puyallup the state may

-------- and there must be a

ndian rights to hunt and fish only on the basis of

-----

--.....__.-...

reasonable conservation measures ,

----

showing

that the regulation under which the Indians were convicted is a
reasonable and necessary conservation measure.

"The special rights

tv'

of the Indians must be accomodated, so long as consistent with pre-

"

servation of the game in question."

conservation requires the resttiction it has imposed here.
fore, the convictions are invalid.

There-

Probable jurisdiction should

be noted,or the con~ictions should be reversed.
see what Justice Douglas has to say.

--

The state has not shown that

Await discussion--

A note may be necessary.
Owens
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1Tt i: er' concurring) I
State - Criminal

Appe~

ANTOINE

v.
WASHINGTON
1.

Timely

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed appellants'

---

conviction for hunting during closed season and possession of
deer during closed season.

The basic questions presented are

whether, by virtue of an agree 1ent with certain
federal goverrunent reserved hunting rights to tn

the
on

their former reservation and, if so, whether the State of
Washington may subject these rights to re8ulation under its
game laws?

.----

- 2 -

2.

FACTS:

Large areas of Eastern Washington were

~

In 1872,

once inhabited by the Colville Confederated Tribes.

they were placed on the Colville Indian Reservation, and half
-

of the 5,340 enrolled members of the tribe still live there.
Appellant Alexander Antoine is an enrolled member of the
tribe, and although his wife, appellant Irene Antoine, is not
an enrolled member, she is nonetheless an Indian.

In September

1971, appellants shot and killed a deer during closed season
in what is now Ferry County, Washington, and was once within
the boundaries of the original Colville Indian Reservation.
The land on which appellants were arrested had been ceded
back to the United States Government by the Colville Confederation
by an 1891 agreement with the United States.

See J.S. Ap ' • F.

Article 6 of the agreement provided:
'It is stipulated and agreed that the
lands to be allotted as aforesaid to said
Indians and the improvements thereon shall
not be subject, within the limitations
prescribe d by law, to taxation for any purpose, national, state or municipal; that said
Indians shall enjoy without let or hindrance
the right at all times freely to use all
wat er power and water courses belonging to
or connected with the lands to be so allotted,
and that the );ight_t~_hunJ;,__<:!JlcLS~i?..l.l ig_comrnon with all.otl1er persons on lands not allotted
to.,. ~~TCi 1Ji4~:·~~s, -~s-·na.fJ~_l1ol.J?~ --i:~.K~~?v.Z?.i-o~ in
fl11YYZ~~1brH!g~.fL
J .s., at 5-6. (Emphasls added.)
At no time did anyone question that appellants were beneficiaries
of this agreement.
3.

DECISION OF THE HASHINGTON SUPREME COURT:

0

a. The SC agreed with appellants that at the time
of the agreement, the provisions of Article 6 were intended to

- 3 -

guarantee the right to hunt on the ceded half of the
reservation to all Indians on the

re~erv~tion

and not simply

the allotment Indianso
bo

Because an Act of Congress at the time of the

agreement barred making treaties with the Indians, this agreement

,____

was a contract and .....__
not a treaty and must be interpreted accordingly.

-

But the State of Washington was not a party to the contract

and the federal government was not authorized to act on its behalf.
Furthermore, the parties could not have intended that Washington
be considered a party to the agreement.
c.

The SC rejected appellants' contention that it

must read into the language promising the continuation of hunting
and fishing rights a promise that the State would not exercise its
rights, under the police power, to regulate hunting upon those
ceded lands which were to become a part of the public domain.
United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914) (lands within the
public domain not subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction are
subject to state jurisdiction).

When Congress passed a law the

year following the agreement and vacated and restored to the public
domain a certain portion of the reservation (upon which these game
law violations occ·urred), it was well aware that these lands would
be opened for settlement and would come under state control.

In

fact, appellants do not challenge the state's power to regulate
the taking of game on these lands; they only claim to be exempt
by virtue of Article 6 of the agreement .

- 4 The SC was unwilling to embrace appellants' further
argument that the rights promised under the agreement must
include immunity from state regulation or else they were
promised nothing which they would not have had without the
agreement.

The agreement does not expressly or impliedly exempt

them from regulation.

The parties contemplated that the Indians

would remain subject to regulation; regulation is not ipso facto
an abridgment; and the agreement meant only that the United
States, as proprietor of the land, would not abridge the Indians'
hunting and fishing rights.
d.

The language of Article 6 -- "in common with all

other persons" -- must be read in the context of the evident
intent of the government at the time to open the lands to
settlement.

So long as the owners of the land allowed others

to hunt thereon, the Indians should be able to do likewise.
Appellants' argument cannot be reconciled with the fact of
cession of all the Indians' "rights, titles, claim and interest"
in the lands.

Furthermore, nm.;rhere in the laws authorizing the

allotment of lands, appropriating money for the purchase of the
Indians' rights, or opening the unallotted land for settlement
is there any reference to the reservation of hunting and fishing
rights.
e.

Finally, even though a state may be bound by a

treaty, a state is not denied the right to enforce against the
Indians its reasonable regulations for the preservation of fish.
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) .

- 5 -

Sounding an "Our Federalism" note, the SC concluded by noting
that its decision is in harmony with preservation of an even
balance between federal and state powers.

Unlike Dick v.

United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908) (recognizing Congress' power
to enter into an agreement with the Indians for a reasonable
period of time prohibiting the introduction of liquor into the
Indian country), the hunting of game is not commerce, and here
there was no clearly articulated intention on the part of
Congress to exclude the states from exercising their reserved
powers.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellants renew their arguments

rejected by the Washington SC.

In a nutshell, they maintain

that their Colville hunting rights were preserved by the 1891
agreement; that federal laws as to Indians are superior to state
law; and that Indian agreements are to be liberally construed
to protect the rights of the Indians with all ambiguities resolved in the Indians' favor.

Appellants further argue that the

state SC's holding that the federal government could make no
agreement concerning Indian rights over wildlife

because the

state was not a party to the agreement violates settled law.
Choate v. Trap£, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); this contravenes Congress'
constitutional power over Indian affairs under Article I, § 8,
clause 3.
5.

DISCUSSION:

·-----

The Washington SC decision strikes me

as vulnerable on several scores as to the correctness of its
analysis and the sharpne ss of its focus, but in the long run the

- 6 -

bottom line may be correct.

In Puyallup Tribe I, the Court

unanimously held that:
"the manner of fishing, the size of the
take and the restriction of con~ercial
fishing, and the like may be regulated
by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets
appropriat e standards and does not discriminate against the Indianso • • • The
overriding police power of the State,
expressed in nondiscriminatory measures
for conserving fish resources, is preserved." 39 :L U.S., at 398-399 o
I

Puyallup Tribe I involved a similar pact with the boilerplate
"in common with" language, but the pivotal question is the
reasonableness of the conservation measure, an inquiry which
the Washington SC never undertook.

-

-

Under the rationale of this

decision, the Washington SC appears to have departed from this
mode of analysis and adopted an approach that basically says
that the State of Washington qua sovereign is not bound by
anything that the United States Government may have once promised
all these Indians when it "bought" their lando

At least under

prior authority, this seems to be a potentially dangerous line
of reasoning and might jeopardize countless agreements and
treaties with various Indian tribes.

It may very well turn out

that these are reasonable game laws, but no such finding has
been made.
Since there is no response, the Court will probably want
to request one.

Moreover, keeping with what seems to be an

established practice, the Court may also
views of the SG.

w~nt

to call for the

.. .
.
- 7 -

There is no response.
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No. 73-717

ANTIONIE v. WASHINGTON

This is another opaque Indian case here on appeal from
the Supreme Court of Washington.

As I dictate this at home,

I do not have for reference the Court's decision in the
cases (391 U.S. 392 and 414 U.S. 44), which
are relied upon by appellants and the SG but virtually ignored
by appellee.
The facts were stipulated (see appellee's brief, p. 7):
Appellants were convicted for killing a deer out of season
in Ferry County within the boundaries of the original Colvil! e
Indian reservation, as established by Executive Order of 1872.
By agreement between the United Statea and the Colville tribes
of 1891, the northern half of the Colville reservation was
c e ded to the United States.

The killing of the deer out of

season occurred in this "northern half" and "outside the
exterior boundaries of the Colville Indian reservation" as
it presently exists.

It occurred also on "unallotted non-

Indian land". ·k
As it is difficult (especially in view of my absence of
learning in Indian law!) to understand the exact sequence
of various official acts and the consequence thereof, I
rely primarily on the memorandum of the SG for this aspect
of the case.

The briefs of the parties are in disagreement

and confusing.
A presidential commission entered into an agreement
with the Tribes in 1891 pursuant to which the Tribes
')'"'Assume the deer was killed on land (e.g. public park or
reservation) of State of Washington and not on land "allotted"
to any private owner.

2.
"surrendered to the United States" the northern half of the
reservation.

Article VI provided that:

"The right to hunt and fish in common with all
other persons on lands not allotted to said
Indians shall not be taken away or in any wise
abridged."
Although it is contemplated that this agreement would
be approved by Congress it was not approved in 1892 when
Congress adopted some of its provisions and "vacated and
restored to the public domain" 1 the northern half of the
reservation, opening it up to settlement in accordance with
"the general laws applicable to the disposition of public
lands in the State of Washington".
to

hunt~ng

Article VI with respect

and fishing was not included in the Act of 1892.

But in 1906, Congress in effect purported to ratify the
1891 agreement.
The SG, agreeing with appellants, states that by virtue
of the ratification the agreement "became a law binding on the
states" (SG's brief, p. 4; Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S.
478).

State of Washington, while not directly meeting the

SG's position that ratification made the agreement binding
on the State of Washington, argues that ratification could
not be a "treaty" because all treaties were barred after
1871.

25 U.S.C. 71.

The State . argues that Congress had

no power, absent a treaty, to deprive it of its "police power"
to enact game

co~servation

laws.

Appellant - apparently with

the SG's approval-contends that the 1891 agreement is "supreme

3.
law" binding on the state and that no game conservation laws
are applicable to the ceded portion of the Colville reservation.
The SG, following Puyallup, retreats from the extreme position
taken by appellant.

Rather, the SG acknowledges that the language

"in common with all other persons" means something.

He quotes

from Puyallup I to the effect that the state, in the interest of
conservation, may regulate the taking of game provided it meets
"appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the
Indians".

The SG then says the appellants' conviction should

be reversed, as the state made no showing here that it had
enacted standards of any kind.
I have no view, not having read the cases, as to whether
the 1891 agreement has the force of a treaty and supercedes the
state's police power.

Unless the provision with respect to

hunting and fishing was a condition subject to which Washington
knowingly took the ceded land in 1891, I would think the state's
police power could not be extinguished by the unilateral act of
congressional ratification of this agreement in 1906.
In any event, if this provision is binding upon the State
of Washington, unless our decisions in the two Puyallup cases*
require a contrary holding, I would think state game conservation laws of general applicability are presumptively valid
and binding upon Indians "in common with all other persons".
they certainly should be!
*My recollection is that a Treaty was involved in Puyallup I
and II. If so, we are back to the question (ignored largely
by briefs) whether a state's police power can be limited by
an Act of Congress not of Treaty dignity?

lfp/ss
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He quotes
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conservation, may regulate the taking of game provided it meets
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The SG then says the appellants' conviction should

be reversed, as the state made no showing here that it had
enacted standards of any kind.
I have no view, not having read the cases, as to whether
the 1891 agreement has the force of a treaty and supercede& the
state's police power.

Unless the provision with respect to

hunting and fishing was

condition subject to which Washington

knowingly took the ceded land in 1891, I would think the state's
police power could not be extinguished by the unilateral act of
congressional ratification of this agreement in 1906.
In any event, if this

pro~ision

is binding upon the State

of Washington, unless our decisions in the two Puyallup cases*
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nd binding upon Indian
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BENCH MEMO

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Ron Carr
No. 73-717

DATE:

December 14, 1974

Antoine and Antoine v. State
of Washington

I recommend that you vote to reverse, essentially on
the basis of the SG's argument.

But I doubt that, in doing

so, you will be giving Mr. and Mrs. Antoine very much reward
for their effort.
Despite its very broad language, the Washington Supreme
Court's opinion had to do essentially with construction of
the 1891 agreement between the Colville Confederation and
the United States, ceding back to the United States the
northern portion of the Colville reservation.

The problem

is the effect of the agreement on Washington's police power

-------

~-

......

over the ceded back portion.

-

If the agreement has the force

of treaty or federal law, then its provision that "the right
to hunt and fish in common with all other persons on lands
not allotted to said Indians shall not be taken away or
in anywise abridged" might limit in some measure the State's
power to apply its conservation laws to Indian hunting in
the northern half.

The Washington court decided, however,

that the agreement neither constituted a treaty nor did it
have the force of law through ratification by Congress.
Hence, Washington's police power over the ceded back portion

2.
is plenary, and the above-quoted provision means only that
(1) Indians remaining in the ceded northern portion will
continue to have hunting rights in the southern portion; or,
at most (2) the Indians will have the hunting rights in the
northern portion common to all persons.

Under either inter-

pretation the Antoines were properly convicted.
The case thus turned on whether the 1891 agreement had
the force of law.

-----time the Indians

n

There is no question that prior to that
had, under the Executive Order granting them

the reservation, exclusive hunting rights in the northern
portion.

Nor is there any doubt that, had Congress ratified

the agreement, it would have had the force of law and the
State's police power would have been, pro tonto, diminished.

-

E.g., (:hoa;e-v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665.

The problem here is

that Congress did not immediately or expressly ratify the
agreement; instead, by act of 1892, it restored the lands to
the public domain, without providing the consideration or
recognizing the rights provided for in the agreement.

The

State's central argument here is that, in doing this, Congress
returned the land to the State's plenary police power, and
that Congress cannot subsequently abrogate this police power
except by express provision.
The SG's response to this is, I think, well taken.

By

act of 1906, Congress authorized payments to Indians "[t]o
carry into effect the [1891] agreement • .

II

In the same

3.
year, in an act appropriating money for such payments, Congress
referred to the Authorization Act as "ratifying the agreement
ceding said land to the United States • . . . "

The SG argues

that this ratification gives the 1891 agreement the force of
law, binding on the State under the Supremacy Clause.
canons of construction are here in conflict:

Two

(1) that limita-

tions on state police power are to be narrowly construed; (2)
thattreaties and agreements with Indians are to be construed
in favor of the subject people, and congressional enactments
for the benefit of Indians are to be liberally construed in
light of Congress's plenary power to protect Indians wherever
located.

E.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236.

I think both canons can be satisfied by adopting the
approach taken in Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, and

~~ PuyalluE Tribe v.
~

Dept. of Game, 391 U.S. 392.

Both cases

dealt with treaties guaranteeing Indians "the right of taking
f ish, at all usual and accustomed • . . stations, . . . in
connnon with all citizens."

The Court held that while the

treaties prevented the State from conditioning the Indians'
right to fish on their obtaining a license, it did not
affect "[t]he overriding police power of the State, expressed
in nondiscriminatory measures for conserving fish resources
II

The language here - that the Indians'

"shall not be

hun~ing

rights

. in anywise abridged" - is, perhaps, a

bit harder to get around than the language in Tulee and

4.
Puyallup, but not much.

The language can be read as meaning

that the Indians may not be excluded from hunting, forced to
pay for the right, or in any way subjected to discriminatory
regulation.

But at the same time, the language was not meant

to impinge on the State's police power to regulate the time
~-----------------------------

and manner of exercising those rights, if the regulations are
reasonably necessary and appropriate for the conservation of
game and therefore of benefit to Indians and non-Indians
alike.
I would hold that the 1891 agreement has the force of
law, and this would require reversal since the State did not

-

establish that its regulation was reasonably necessary and
appropriate to conservation.

R. C.
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Rec irculated: __ - -- - -

Alexander J. Antoine et ux., 0 . .
h S
f
Appellants,
n Appeal rom t e upreme Court of Washv.
.mgt on.
State of Washington,

,.

[January - , 1975]
MR. JusTICE BRENl'fAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The appellants, husband and wife, a.re Indians. 1 They
were convicted in the Superior Court of the State of
·washington of the offenses of hunting and possession of
deer during closed season in violation of RCW 77.16.020
and RCW 77.16.030. 2 The offenses occurred on unal:t. The appellant husband i~> an enrolled member of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation. Appellant wife
is a. Canadian Indian and is not enrolied in the United States. The
State of Washington did not however contest before the state courtsthat both appellants are entitled to the rights of members of the
Colville Tribes on the property in question. The State Supreme
Conrt stated, " .. . it is not questioned that [the husband] and his
wife are beneficiaries of the t1greement .. . ." 82 Wn. 2d 440, 511
P. 2d 1351 (1973) . Appellee state conceded at. oral argument in
this Court that reversal of the husband's conviction requires reversal of the wife's conviction. Tr. p. 22.
Tribes that formed the Confederated Tribes include the Colville,
Columbia, San Poi!, Okanogan, Nez Perce, Lake, Spokane and
Coeur d' Alene.
2 The :Uieged offenses occurred on September 11, 1971, in FerryCounty on unallotted non-Indian land within the ceded northern haH
of the original reservatwn.
RCW 77.16..020 provides in pertinent part~
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lotted non-Indian land in what was once the north half
of the Colville Indian Reservation. 3 The Colville Confederated Tribes ceded to the United States that northern
half under a congressionally ratified and adopted Agreement dated May 19, 1891. Article 6 of that ratified
Agreement provided expressly that "the right to hunt
and fish in common with all other persons on lands not
allotted to said Indians shall not be taken away or in
anywise abridged. 4 Appellants' defense was that con"It :;hall be unlawful for any person to hunt ... game animals ...
during the respective closed seasons therefor.

'
"Any person who hunts . . . deer in violation of this section is
guilty of a gross misdemeanor .... "
RCW 77.16.030 provides in pertinent part:
''It shall be lmlawful for any person to have in his possession ...
any ... game animal ... during the closed season . ..
"Any prrson who has on hi~ po:;session . . any . . deer . . . in
violation of the foregomg portion of this section is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor ...."
3 The original re~ervation was over 3 million acres "bound on the
eal:!t and south by the Columbm Rivrr, on the west by the Okanogan
R1ver. and on the north by thP British possessions." Executive
Order of July 2, 1872, 1 Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties
916 (2d ed. 1904); l:!ee also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S.
351, 354 (1962) .
4 Article 6 providrs in full:
"It i:; stipulated and agreed that the lands to be allotted as afore~aid to said Indians and the improvements thereon shall not be subject, w1thin the limitations prescribed by law, to taxation for any purpose, national, state or municipal; that said Indian~ shall enjoy
without let or hmdrance the right at all times freely to use all water
power and water courses belonging to or connected with the lands to
bE> t:.O allotted, and that the right to hunt and fish in common with aiJ
other personK on lands uot allotted to said Indians shall not be taken
away or in anywise abridged."
The ~tatus of the southem half of the Colville Reservation was
cons~derecl in Seymour v. Superintendent, supra, n. 3 At ISsue in

.

'

.
'

..,

;.,

'73-:"!17 - OPINION

ANTOINE v. WASHINGTON

3

·gressional approval of Art. 6 preserved by federal sta.tute
the exclusive, absolute and unrestricted rights to hunt
and fish that had been part of the Indians larger rights
in the ceded portion of the reservation, thus limiting
·governmental regula.tion of the rights to federal regulation and precluding application by the State of Washington of RCW 77.16.020 and RCW 77.16:030 to them.
·The Supreme Court of Washington held that the ·superior
Court had properly rejected this defense and affirmed the
convictions, 82 Wn. 2d 440, 511 P. 2d 1351 (1973). We
noted probable jurisdiction, 417 U. ·s. 966 (1'974). We
reverse.
I
President Grant established the origina1 Colville Indian Reservation by Executive Order of July 2, 1872.
Washington became a State in 1889, 26 Stat. 10, and the
next year, by the Act of August 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 355,
Congress created the Commission that negotiated the
1891 Agreement. 5 By its terms, the Tribes ceded the
northern half of the reservation in return for benefits
this ca.se are the residual rights to hunt and fish on the northern
half preserved by the above Art. 6.
6 The Colville Indian Cornmis~ion was composed of Chairman
Fullerton, and Commissioners Durfur and P11.yne. The Commission
first met. on May 7, 1891, with representatives of the Confederated
Tribes at Nespelem, Washingto!l, on the reservation, and according
to the minutes of that meeting thf' immediate topic of discussion was
"a ~ale of a part of Reservation .. .." During succeeding days, KoMo-Del-Kiah, Chief of the San Poi!, strongly opposed the sale of
any part of the reservation, but Antoine, Chief of the Okanogan
and great grandfather of appellant Alexander Antoine, Moses, Chief
of the Columbia, and .Joseph, Chief of the Nez Perce, favored the
proposed 1R91 Agreement as fair. At a later meeting on May 23 at
Marcus on tlw reservation, Barnaby, Chirf of the Colville, and the·
Chief of the Lake agreed to the proposed sale. Minutes of Colville
Ind1an Commission Concerning Negotiation for the 1891 Agreement
(()f Sale, National Archive~ Document 21167.
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which included the stipulations of Art. 6 and the promise
of the UnHed States to pay $1,500,000 in five install ..
ments. The Agreement was to become effective, however, only "from and after its approv~l by Congress."
Congressional approval was given in a series of statutes.
The first statute was the Act of July 1, 189Z, 27 Stat. 62,
which "vacated l:j,nd restored [the tract] to the public
domain . . . ," and "open [ ed] . . . [it] . . . to settlemerit...." The second statut.e came 14 years later, the
Act of June 21 , 1906, 34 Stat. 325, 337-338. That statute
in terms "carr[ied] into effect the Agreement," and
authorized the appropriation of the $1,500,000. Payment of the $1,500,000 was effected by five subsequent
enactments from 1907 t.o 1911, each of which appropriated $300,000 and recited that it was part payment "to
the Indians on the Colville Reservation, Washington, for
the cession of land opened to settlement by the Act of
July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-two ... being a
part of the full sum set aside and held in the Treasury
of the United States in payment for s&id land under the
terms of the Aet of June first, nineteen hundred and six,
ratifying the agreement ceding said la.nd to the United
States under date of May ninth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-one .... " (Emphasis supplied.) 34 Stat. 1015,
1050-1051 (1907); 35 Stat. 70, 96 (1908); 35 Stat. 781,
813 (Hl09); 36 Stat. 269, 286 (1910); 36 Stat. 1058, 1075
(1911). 6
6 The delay in approval was occasioned by the initial reluctance
of the House to ratify the Agreement without certain changes, 23
Cong. Rec. 3840, and by doubts raised in the Senate whether the
Indian:> had title to the reservation, since it was created by Executive
Order. See S. Hep. No. 664, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. The
Interior Department reported ~orne years later that the doubts were
unfounded. S. Rep. No. 2651, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 137, 139. A
House b1ll passed in 1891 replaced the $1,500,000 lump sum with
a payment of $1.25 per acre, to be paid to the credit of the Indians
~IS the land would be operwd for homesteadipg. The Senate dis--
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II
Although admitted to statehood two years earlier, the
State of Washington was not a pa.rt.y to the 1891 Agreew
ment. The opinion of the State Supreme Court relies
upon that fact to attempt 11 distinction for purposes of
the Supremacy Clause 7 between the binding result upon
agreed, however, and passed the Senate Bill that became the Act of
July 1, 1892. That Act n1akes no mention either of the consideration to be paid, or of the hunting and fishing rights preserved.
Many protests were registered that Congress had failed to live up
to the terms of the Agreement. These included protests from the
Department of the Interior, S. Rep. No. 2561, 59th Cong., 1st Bess.,
137, 139, and from Chairman Fullerton, who had become Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington. In a letter, S. Rep .
No. 2561, supra, p. 40, the Chief Justice said:
"It may be that my relations to this transaction have somewhat
warped my judgment, but when I recall the impassioned appeals
made by some of the aged memb~rs of these remnant bands, calling
upon their people and upon the heads of the t.ribes not to sign away
their lands, even though the compensation offered was ample, on
the ground that it was their last heritage and their last tie on
earth, I cannot help a feeling of bitterness when I remember that
the Government, whom we represented to them as being just and
honorable, took away their land without even the solace of
compensation."
These protests and many others finally bore fruit and resulted in
Congress' enactment of the Act of June 21, 1906, and the fiV& subsequent installment acts. The Colville retained some 16 lawyers
practicing in the States of Washington, Pennsyvlania, and Georgia,
and the Distnct of Columbia, who recovered judgments for their
services in the Court of Claims. Butler and Vale v. United States,
43 Ct.. Cl. 497 (1908).
'1 Article Vl, cl. 2, of l he Constitution, the Supremacy Clause,
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''This Con~titution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
he made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 111 every State ;;hall beJ
bonnd thereby, any Thing m the Constitution or L!IWS of any Stat~
to Lhe Contrary notwithbtancling."

.~.

.

.",
'·

73-117--:0PINTON
ANTOINE v. WASHINGTON

the State of ratification of a cqntract by treaty effecteq
by concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, Art. II, § 2,
cl. 2, and the binding result of ratification of a contract
effected by legislation passed by the House and the
Senate. The opinion states that "once ratified, a treaty
becomes the supreme law of the land," but the ratified
1891 Agreement was a mere contract enforceable "only
against those party to it," and "not a treaty ... [and] ..•
not the supreme law of the land." 82 Wn. 2d 444, 511
P . 2d 1354. The grounds for this attempted distinction
do not clearly emerge from the 6pinion. The opinion
states, however, "[tlhe statutes enacted by Congress in
implementation of this [1891] agreement . . . are the
supreme law if they are within the power of Congress to
enact ... ,, 82 Wn. 2d 451, 51'1 P. 2d 1358. In the
context of the discussion in the opinion we take this to
mean that the Congress is not constitutionally em~
powered to inhibit a State's exercise of its police power
by legislation ratifying a contract between the Executive
Branch and an Indian tribe to which the State is not a
party. The fallacy in that proposition is that a legislated
ratification of an agreement between the Executive
Brs.nch and an Indian tribe is a "Law of the United
States made in Pursuance'' of the Constitution and, therefore, like "all Treaties made/' is made binding upon
affected States by the Supremacy Clause.
The opinion seems to find support for the attempted
distinction in the fact that the Executive Branch was
not authorized to contract by treaty with Indian tribes
in 1891. 82 Wn. 2d 444, 511 P. 2d 1354. Twenty years
earlier, in 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, Congress had abrogated
the contract by treaty method of dealing with Indian
tribes.M The Act of 1871 resulted from the opposition
3 The Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat . 544, 566, 25 U. S. C. § 7t
lJrovid(:'d .
"No lnclum natwn or trihe within the territory of the United!
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of the House of Representatives to its practical exclusion
from any policy role in Indian affairs. .F or nearly a
century the Executive Branch made treaty arrangements
with the Indians "by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate," Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although the House
ttppropriated money to carry out these treaties, it had no
voice in the development of substantive Indian policy
reflected in them. House resentment first resulted in
legislation in 1867 repealing "all laws allowing the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs to enter into treaties with any Indian
tribes," Act of March 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 7, 9, but this was
repealed a few months later, Act of July 20, 1867, 15 Stat.
18. There were further unsuccessful Hotlse attempts to
enter the field of federal Indian policy, and ultimately
the House refused to grant funds to carry out new
treaties. United States Department of the Interior,
Federal Indian Law, 1958, at 211. Finally, the Senate
capitulated and joined the House in passage of the 1871
Act as a rider to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871.
Federal Indian Law, supra, at 138.9
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified
w1th such lndian nation or tribe prwr to March third, eighteen hundred ~nd seventy-one, l:ihall be hereby mvalidated or impaired."
a Formrr Commissioner of Indian Affair~ Walker summa.rized the
f'trugglr as fotlows :
"In 1871, how<'ver, tlJP insolence of conscious l:itrength, and the
growing Jealoul:iy of the Honse of Representatives towardl:i the prProgative-arrogated by the Senate-of determming, in connection
with the execuhv<". all qnrstions of Indian right and title, and of
tommittmg the Umted Stair, incidentally to pecuniary obligation8
limited only by ns own ch;;cretion, for which tho House should be
hound to make provision without inquiry, led to the adoption , after
seveml severe parliamentar) struggles of the declaration . .. that
hereafter 'no India11 nation or tribe within the territory of thf•
Uruted State~ :-;hall bt> acknowlrdged or recogniz,ed a.~ an mdc-pendent
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This abrogation of the contract by treaty method
meant uo more than that after 1871 relations with
Indians would be governed by Acts of Congress rather
than by treaty. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884);
In re Heff, 197 U. S. 488 (1905 ). But abrogation of the
contract by treaty method in no way affected Congress'
power to legislate on problems of Indians, including legislating the ratification of contracts of the Executive
Branch with Indian tribes to which affected States were
not parties. Several decisions of this Court settled that
proposition. In Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912),
the Court held that tax exemptions contained in an 1897
agreement ratified by Congress between the United
States and Indian tribes a.s part of a cession of Indian
lands were enforceable against the State of Oklahoma,
which was not a party to the agreement. In Perrin v.
Un£ted States, 232 U. S. 78 (1914), the Court enforced
a clause of an agreement ratified by Act of Congress that
no intoxicating liquor should be sold on land in South Da~
kota ceded and relinquished to the United States, fl,lthough
So,uth Dakota was not a party to the agreement. The
Court expressly rejected the contention that the power
to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors upon all ceded
lands rested exclusively in the State. Rather, because
Congress was empowered, when securing the cession of
part of an Indian reservation withi11 a State, to prohibit
the sale of intoxicants upon the ceded lands, "it follows
that the State possesses no exclusive control over the
subject and that the congressional prohibition. is supr·eme." 232 U. S., at 483. See also Dick v. United
States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908). These decisions sustained
the ratified agreements as the exercise by Congress of
its "plenary power ... to deal with the special problems
nation, tribe, or power, with whom the UnitPd States may contract
by treaty.'" Federal Indian Law, 1:rupra, at 211-212, citing Walker"
The Indian Que<>tion~ 1874,

'•
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of Indians [that] is drawn both explicitly and implicitly
from the Constitution itself. Article I, ,§ 8, 'cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to regulate commerce .. ,
with the Indian Tribes and thus, to this extent, singles
Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation."
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551-552 (1974); see
also Morton v. RU?:z, 415 U. S. 199, 236 (1974).
Once ratified by Act of Congress, the provisions of the
agreements become law, and like treaties, are the supreme
law of the land. In the absence of any contract between
the Executive Branch and the Colville Confederated
Tribes, Congress could constitutionally have .terminated
the northern half of the Colville Indian Reservation on
the same terms and conditions that ultimately appeared
in the 1891 agreement. Maatz v. Arnett, 412 b. S. 481
(1973). The decisions in Choate, Perrin, and Dick,
supra, settle that Congress was also constitutionally empowered to do so by legislation ratifying the 1891 agreement. The legislative ratification constituted the provisions of the 1891 Agreement, incluqing Art. 6, "Laws
of the United States ... in Pursuance" of the Constitution, and the supreme law of the land, just as a contract
by treaty to the same effect, concurred in by the Senate,
would have been a treaty binding upon the State. "Congress has power to regulate commerce with the Indian
tribes, and such power is superior and paramount to the
authority of any State within whose limits are Indian
tribes." Dick v. United States, supra, 208 U. S., at 353.w
l() WRC 37.12.060, which assumes limited jurisdiction over Indians,
expressly provides that the law shall not deprive any Indian of
righi s secured by agreement.
"Nothing in this chapter . . shall deprive any Indian or any Indian
tnbe, band, community of any right , privilege, or immunity afforded
under federal treaty, agreement, statute, or Executive Order with
rcsp('ct to Indian land grants, hunting trapping, or fishing or the
C()ntrol, licensing, or regulation thereof." (Emphasis addedo)
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III
The opuuon of the State Supreme Court also holds
that in any event the implementing statutes cannot be
construed to render RCW 77.16.020 and RCW 77.16.030
inapplicable to Indian beneficiaries of the Agreement
since the implementing statutes "make no reference to
the provision [Article 6] relied upon by the appellants."
82 Wn. 2d 451, 511 P. 2d 1358. The opin~on reasons,
"if it was thought that state regulation but not federal
regulation would constitute an abridgement, an express
provision to that effect should have been inserted, but
only after the consent of the state had been sought and
obtained." 82 Wn. 2d 448, 511 P. 2d 1357. This
reasoning is fatally flawed. The proper inquiry is not
whether the State was or should have been a consenting
party to the 1891 Agreement, but whether appellants
acquired federally guaranteed rights by congr~ssional
ratification of the Agreement. Plainly appellants acquire such rights. Congress exercised its pleanry constitutional powers to legislate those federally protected
rights into law in enacting the implementing statutes
that ratified the Agreement. State qualification of the
rights is therefore precluded by force of the Supremacy
Clause, and neither an express provision precluding state
qualification nor the consent of the State was required.
On the contrary, if Congress had meant to subject to
state regulation the preserved rights to hunt and fishr
this Court would require that such intent explicitly
appear on the face of the statutes or in their legislative
history. "A congressional determination to terminate: {
[a reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act
or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history." Maatz v. Arnett, supra, 412 U. S., at;
505. Since the Colville Indians rights to hunt and fish
on the ceded northern half of the Colville Reservation

.

'

'

...

.•'

ANTOINE v. WASHINGTON

11

are part of their larger rights in that ceded half, see
Menominee Tribe v. United States 1 391 U.S. 404 (1968)/1
we hold that a congressional determination to subject
thos~ghts to qualification by state regulation must
similarly "be expressed on the face of the statutes or be
clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative
history."
But no congressional purpose to subject the preserved
rights to such state regulation is to be found in
either the implementing acts or their legislative history.
Rather, the implementing statutes unqualifiedly, '~carr [ied] into effect" and "ratif [ied]" the explicit and
unqualified provision of Art. 6 that "the r~ght to hunt
and fish .
shall not be taken away or in anywise
abridged."

IV
FinaJly, the opinion of the State Supreme Court construes Art. 6 as merely a promise by the United States
that so long as it retained any ceded land and allowed
others to hunt thereon, Indians would be allowed also to
hunt there. 82 Wn., at 449-450, 511 P. 2d, at 1357-1358.
But the provision of Art. 6 that the preserved rights are
not exclusive and are to be enjoyed "in common with all
other persons," does not support that interpretation or
affect the Supremacy Clause's preclusion of qualifying
u Even without an express provision preserving hunting and fishing rights, Menominee stated that those rights are "part of the larger
rights possf'Ssed by the Indians in the lands used and occupied by
them," Federal Indian Law, supra, at 497, citing Op. Act. Sol. M.
28107, and survive the termination of the reservation. There is
no merit in the State's argument that the termination of the northern
half of the Reservation by the 1.892 Act without mention of Art. 6
or any other specific preservation of hunting and fishing rights left
the State free to regulate the Indians' exercise of those rights. But
in any event the 1892 Act was only one of the series of statutr'8
Congre~s passed to ratify the 1891 Agreement , including Art . 6.
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state regulation. Non-Indians are, of course, not beneficiaries of the preserved rights and the State remains
wholly free to prohibit or regulate non-Indian hunting
and fishing. The ratifying legislation must be construed
to exempt the Indians' preserved rights from like state
regulation, however, else Congress preserved nothing
which the Indians would not have had without that legislation. For it is impermissible in the absence of explicit
congressional expression, to construe the implementing
acts as "an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word
of the nation for more." United States v. Winans, 198
U. S. 371, 380 (1905); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game (Puyallup !), 391 U. S. 392, 397-398 (1968).
·Winans involved a treaty that reserved to the Indians
in the area ceded to the United States "the right of taking
fish at all usual and accustomed pll:\-ces, in common with
citizens of the Territory." 198 U. S., supra, at 378.
Puyallup considered a provision that "[t]he right of taking fish , at all usual a.nd accustomed grounds and stations,
.is further secured to said Indians, in common with all
citizens of the Territory .. . ." 391 U. S., supra, at 395.
The Court held that rights so preserved "may, of course,
not be qualified by the State . . . ." 391 U. S., supra,
at ~98; 198 U. S., supra, at 384. Article 6 presents an
even stronger case since Congress' ratification of it included the flat prohibition that the right "shall not be
taken away or in anywise abridged."
The canon of construction that this Court has applied
over a century is that the wording of treaties and agreements with the Indians are not to be construed to their
prejudice. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). See also The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)'
737, 760 ( 1866) ; United States v. Kaga.ma, 118 U. S. 375
(1886); Choc taw Nations v~ United States, 119 U. S. 1,.
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28 (1886); Umted States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 380381 (1905); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912);
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404, 406 n.
2 (1968). That canon furthers discharge of "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealing with these dependent and sometimes
exploited people," Seminole Nation v. United States, 316
U. S. 286, 296 (1942); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S., supra,
at 236. 'V'e have no reason in this case, however, to invoke that canon of construction. The clarity and com- l
plete absence of ambiguity in the wording of Art. 6 makes
resort to the canon wholly unnecessary.

v
In Puyallup Tribe v. United States, supra, 391 U. S.,
at 398, we held that although, these rights "may ... not
be qualified by the State, ... the manner of fishing [and
hunting], the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing [and hunting] and the like may be regulated
by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not
discriminate against the Indians." 391 U. S., supra, at
398. The "appropriate standards" requirement means
that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a
re::asonable and necessary conservation measure, Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (1973);
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681,684 (1942), and that
its application to the Indians is necessary in the interest
of conservation.
The United States as amicus curiae, invites the Court
to announce that state restrictions "cannot abridge the
Indians' federally protected rights without [the State]
demonstrating a compelling need'' in the interest of conservation. Brief of the United States as amicus curiae,
pp. 14-16. We have no occasion in this case to address
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this question. The State of Washington has not argued,
let alone esta~lished, that applying the ban on out-ofseason hunting of deer by the Indians on the land in
question is in any way necessary or even useful for the
conservation of deer. See Hunt v. United States, 278
U.S. 96 (1928). 12
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington sustaining appellants' convictions is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

12 Appellants apparently claim no right to hunt on fenced private
property. The State Supreme Court stated:
"Counsel . .. conceded in oral argument that the present owners;
of land in the northern half of the reservation have the right ta
fence their land and exclude hunters. Nevertheless they maintain
t,hat state regulation of the right to hlllnt is an abridgement of that

right , , . :•· 82 Wn. 2d 448, 5U P, 2.d 13;5!1.
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Dear Bill:
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I read your fine opinion over the weekend,
and will be happy to join you. The one concem which
I have relates to hunting on private land. Your note
12 (p. 14) comes fairly close to the point. I would
prefer, however, to put up a "smoke signal" that will
make our message to the "Injuns" somewhat sharper.
For example, perhaps an additiunsl paragraph in the
footnote along the. followi'L1g lines would be helpful:

''
,, .
>

>:

"A claim of entitlement to hunt on
fenced or posted private land without prior
permission of the owner would raise serious
questions not presented in this case."
Indeed, I would prefer to say categorically that .
the reserved right to hunt cannot be construed as
conferring the hunting privilege except on publicly
,.
owned land or private land with prior permission of the ·r;
owner.

,.

'•h: ~'

Without having checked the transcript of oral
argument, my recollection is that the offense in this
case occurred on private land, although no issue was
made of this.
Sincerely,
Mr. Justice Brennan
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Dear Bill:
In due course I will circulate a dissent in the
above case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 73-717
Alexander J. Antoine et ux.,
On Appeal from the SuAppellants,
preme Court of Washv.
ington,
State of Washington,
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The appellants, husband and wife, a.re Indians. 1 They
were convicted in the Superior Court of the State of
Washington of the offenses of hunting and possession of
deer during closed season in violation of RCW 77.16.020
and RCW 77.16.030. 2 The offenses occurred on unalThe appellant husband is an enrolled member of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation. Appellant wife
is a Canadian Indian and is not enrolled in the United States. The
State of Washington did not however contest before the state courts
that both appellants are entitled to the rights of members of the
Colville Tribes on the propert.y in question. The State Supreme
Court stated, " . . . it is not questioned that [the husband] and his
wife are beneficiaries of the agreement . .. ." 82 Wn. 2d 440, 511
P . 2d 1351 (1973). Appellee state conceded at oral argument in
this Court that reversal of the husband's conviction requires reversal of the wife's conviction. Tr. p. 22.
Tribes that formed the Confederated Tribes include the Colville,
Columbia, San Poil, Okanogan, Nez Perce, Lake, Spokane and
Coeur d' Alene.
2 The alleged offenses occurred on September 11, 1971, in :Ferry
County on unallotted non-Indian land within the ceded northern half
of the original reservation.
RCW 77.16.020 provides in pertinent part:
1
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lotted non-Indian land in what was once the north half
of the Colville Indian Reservation. 3 The Colville Confederated Tribes ceded to the United States that northern
half under a congressionally ratified and adopted Agreement dated May 19, 1891. Article 6 of that ratified
Agreement provided expressly that "the right to hunt
and fish in common with all other persons on lands not
allotted to said Indians shall not be taken away or in
anywise abridged." 4 Appellants' defense was that con"It shall be unlawful for any person to hunt ... game animals ...
during the respective closed seasons therefor.
"Any person who hunts . . . deer in violation of this section ie
guilty of a gross misdemeanor ...."
RCW 77.16.030 provides in pertinent part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession ...
any ... game animal ... during the closed season ...
"Any person who has on hil' possession . . . any . . . deer ... in
violation of the foregoing portion of this section is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor ... ."
8 The original reservation was over 3 million acres "bound on the
east and south by the Columbia River, on the west by the Okanogan
River, and on the north by the British possessions." Executive
Order of July 2, 1872, 1 Kappler, Indian Affair~, Laws and Treaties
916 (2d ed. 1904); see also Seymour v. Supert'ntendent, 368 U. S.
351, 354 (1962) .
4 Article 6 provides in full :
"It is stipulated and agreed that the land~ to be allotted as aforesaid to said Indians and the improvements thereon shall not be subject, within the limitations prescribed by law, to taxation for any purpose, national, state or municipal; that said Indians shall enjoy
without let or hindrance the right at all times freely to use all water
power and water courses belongmg to or connected with the lands to
be so allotted, and that the right to hunt :md fish in common with all
other persons on lands not allotted to said Indians shall not be taken
.away or in anywise abridged."
The status of the southern half of the Colville Reservation was
consi_dered in Seymou.r v. Superintendent, supra, n. 3. At issue ill
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gressional approval of Art. 6 preserved by federal statute
the exclusive, absolute and unrestricted rights to hunt
and fish that had been part of the Indians larger rights
in the ceded portion of the reservation, thus limiting
governmental regulation of the rights to federal regulation and precluding application by the State of Washington of RCW 77.16.020 and RCW 77.16.030 to them.
The Supreme Court of Washington held that the Superior
Court had properly rejected this defense and affirmed the
convictions, 82 Wn. 2d 440, 511 P. 2d 1351 (1973). We
noted probable jurisdiction, 417 U. S. 966 (1974). We
reverse.
I
President Grant established the original Colville Indian Reservation by Executive Order of July 2, 1872.
Washington became a State in 1889, 26 Stat. 10, and the
next year, by the Act of August 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 355,
Congress created the Commission that negotiated the
1891 Agreement. 5 By its terms, the Tribes ceded the
northern half of the reservation in return for benefits
this case are the residual rights to hunt and fish on the northern
half preserved by the above Art. 6.
5 The Colville Indian Commis~ion was composed of Chairman
Fullerton, and Commissioners Durfur and Payne. The Commission
first met on May 7, 1891, with representatives of the Confederated
Tribes at Nespelem, Washington, on the reservation, and according
to the minutes of that meeting the immediate topic of discussion was
"a sale of a patt of Reservation ...." During succeeding days, KoMo-Del-Kiah, Chief of the San Poil, stronglv opposed the sale of
any part of the rest>rvation, but Antoine, Chief of the Okanog~n
and great grandfather of appellant Alexander Antoine, Moses, Chief
of the Columbia, and Joseph, Chief of the Nez Perce, favored the
proposed 1R91 Agreement as f11ir. At a later meeting on May 23 at
Marcus on the reservation, Barnaby, Chief of the Colville, and the
Chief of the Lake agreed to the proposed sale. Minutes of Colville
Indian Commission Concerning Negotiation for the 1891 Agreement
of Sale, National Archives Document 21167.
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which included the stipulations of Art. 6 and the promise
of the United States to pay $1,500,000 in five installments. The Agreement was to become effective, how·
ever, only "from and after its approval by Congress."
Congressional approval was given in a series of statutes.
The first statute was the Act of July 1, 1892, 27 Stat. 62,
which "vacated and restored [the tract] to the public
domain ... ," and "open [ ed] ... [it] ... to settlemerit .... " The second statute came 14 years later, the
Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325, 337-338. That statute
in terms "carr[ied] into effect the Agreement," and
authorized the appropriation of the $1,500,000. Payment of the $1,500,000 was effected by five subsequ~nt
enactments from 1907 to 1911, each of which appropriated $300,000 .and recited that it wa.s part payment "to
the Indians on the Colville Reservation, Washington, for
the cession of land opened to settlement by the Act of
July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-two ... being a
part of the full sum set aside and held in the Treasury
of the United States in payment for said land under the
terms of the Act of June first, nineteen hundred and six,
ratifying the agreement ceding said land to the United
States under date of May ninth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-one .... " (Emphasis supplied.) 34 Stat. 1015,
1050-1051 (.1907); 35 Stat. 70, 96 (1908); 35 Stat. 781,
813 (1909); 36 Stat. 269, 286 ( 1910); 36 Stat. 1058, 1075
(1911).6
6 The delay in approval was occasioned by the initial reluctance
of the House to ratify the Agreement without certain changes, 23
Cong. Rec. 3840, and by doubts raised in the Senate whether the
Indians had title to the reservation, since it was created by Executive
Order. See S. Rep. No. 664, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. The
Interior Department reported some yearn later that. tho doubts were
unfounded. S. Rep. No. 2651, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 137, 139. A
House bill passed in 1891 replaced the $1,500,000 lump sum with
a payment of $1 .25 per acre, to be paid to the credit of the Indians
as the land would be opened for homesteading. The Senate dis..
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II
Although admitted to statehood two years earlier, the
State of Washington was not a pa.rty to the 1891 Agreement. The opinion of the State Supreme Court relies
upon that fact to attempt a distinction for purposes of
the Supremacy Clause 7 between the binding result upon
agreed, however, and passed the Senate Bill that became the Act of
July 1, 1892. That Act makes no mention either of the consideration to be paid, or of the hunting and fishing rights preserved .
Many protests were registered that Congress had failed to live up
to the terms of the Agreement. These included protests from the
Department of the Interior, S. Rep. No. 2561, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.,
137, 139, and from Chairman Fullerton, who had become Chief
Justice of t.he Supreme Court of Wa~hington. In a letter, S. Rep.
No. 2561, supra, p. 40, the Chief Justice said:
"It may be that my relations to this transaction have somewhat
warped my judgment, but when I recall the impassioned appeals
made by some of the aged members of these remnant bands, calling
upon their people and upon the heads of the tribes not to sign away
their lands, even though the compensation offered was ample, on
the ground that it was their last heritage and their last tie on
earth, I cannot help a feeling of bitterness when I remember that
the Government, whom we represented to them as being just and
honorable, took away their land without even the solace of
compensation ."
These protests and many others finally bore fruit and resulted in
Congress' enactment of the Act of June 21, 1906, and the five subsequent installment acts. The Colville retained some 16 lawyers
practicing in the States of Washington, Pennsyvlania, and Georgia,
and the District of Columbia, who recovered judgments for their
services in the Court of Claims. Butler and Vale v. United States,
43 Ct. Cl. 497 (1908).
7 Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause,
provides:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
\o the- Comtrary notwithstanding."

...
.,

..
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the State of ratification of a contract by treaty effected
by concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, Art. II, § 2,
cl. 2, and the binding result of ratification of a contract
effected by legislation passed by the House and the
Senate. The opinion states that "once ratified, a treaty
becomes the supreme law of the land," but the ratified
1891 Agreement was a mere contract enforceable "only
against those party to it," and "not a treaty ... [and] ...
not the supreme law of the land." 82 Wn. 2d 444, 511
P. 2d 1354. The grounds for this attempted distinction
do not clearly emerge from the opinion. The opinion
states, however, "[t]he statutes enacted by Congress in
implementation of this [1891] agreement . . . are the
supreme law if they are within the power of Congress to
enact . . . ." 82 Wn. 2d 451, 511 P. 2d 1358. In the
context of the discussion in the opinion we take this to
mean that the Congress is not constitutionally empowered to inhibit a State's exercise of its police power
by legislation ratifying a contract between the Executive
Branch and an Indian tribe to which the State is not a
party. The fallacy in that proposition is that a legislated
ratification of an agreement between the Executive
Branch and an Indian tribe is a "Law of the United'
States made in Pursuance" of the Constitution and, therefore, like "all Treaties made," is made binding upon
affected States by the Supremacy Clause.
The opinion seems to find support for the attempted
distinction in the fact that the Executive Branch was
not authorized to contract by treaty with Indian tribes
in 1891. 82 Wn. 2d 444, 511 P. 2d 1354. Twenty years
earlier, in 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, Congress had abrogated
the contract by treaty method of dealing with Indian
tribes. 8 The Act of 1871 resulted from the o'pposition
The Act of Marcl1 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, 25 U. S. C. § 71
provided :
<'No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
8
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of the House of Representatives to its practical exclusion
from any policy role in Indian affairs. For nearly a
century the Executive Branch made treaty arrangements
with the Indians "by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate," Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although the House
appropriated money to carry out these treaties, it had no
voice in the development of substantive Indian policy
reflected in them. House resentment first resulted in
legislation in 1867 repealing "all laws allowing the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs to enter into treaties with any Indian
tribes," Act of March 28, 1867, 15 Stat. 7, 9, but this was
repealed a few months later, Act of July 20, 1867, 15 Stat.
18. There were further unsuccessful House attempts to
enter the field of federal Indian policy, and ultimately
the House refused to grant funds to carry out new
treaties. United States Department of the Interior,
Federal Indian Law, 1958, at 211. Finally, the Senate
capitulated and joined the House in passage of the 1871
Act as a rider to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871.
Federal Indian Law, supra, at 138.9
State;; shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe. or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ra.tified
with such Indian nation or tnbe 11rior to March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, ::;hall be hereby invalidated or impaired."
9 Former Commissioner of Indian Affairs Walker summarized the
struggle as follows:
''In 1871, however, the insolence of conscious strength, and the
growing jealousy of the House of Reprebentatives towards the prerogative-arrogated by the Senate-of determming, in connection
with the executive. all questions of Indian r1ght and title, and of
committing the United States incidentally to pecuniary obligations
limited only by its own d1scretwn, for wh1ch the House should be
bound to make prov1sion w1thout mquiry, led to the adoption, after
l:leveral severe parhamentary struggles of the declaration . . that
hereafter 'no Indian nation or tnbc within the terntory of the
United States &hall be acknowledged or recogmzed as an independent

73 717-0PINION
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This abrogation of the cont,ract by treaty method
meant no more than that after 1871 relati,ons with
Indians would be governed by Acts of Congress rather
than by treaty. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884);
In re Heff, 197 U. S. 488 (1905). But abrogation of the
contract by treaty method in no way affected Congress'
power to legisla-te on problems of Indians, including legislating the ratification of contracts of the Executive
Branch with Indian tribes to which affected States were
not parties. Several decisions of this Court settled that
proposition. lt1 Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912),
the Court held that tax exernptions contained in an 1897
agreement ratified by Congress between the United
States and Indian tribes as part of a cession of Indian
lands were enforceable against the State of Oklahoma,
which was not a party to the agreement. In Perri'n v.
United States, 232 U. S. 78 (1914). the Court enforced
a clause of an agreement ratified by Act of Congress that
no intoxicating liquor should be sold on land in South Dakota ceded and relinquished to the United States, although
South Dakota was not a party to the agreement. The
Court expressly rejected the contention that the power
to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors upon all ceded
lands rested exclusively in the State. Rather, because
Congress was empowered, when securing the cession of
part of an Indian reservation within a State, to prohibit
the sale of intoxicants upon the ceded lands, "it follows
that the State possesses no exclusive control over the
subject and that the congressional prohibition is supreme." 232 U. S .. at 483. See also Dick v. United
States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908). These decisions sustained
the ratified agreements as the exercise by Congress of
its "plenary power ... to deal with the special problems
nation, tribe, or power, with whom the United States may contract
by treaty'" Federal Indian Law, supra, at 211-212, citing- Walker,
The Indian Question, 1874.

73-717-0PINION
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of Indians [that] is drawn both explicitly and implicitly
from the Constitution itself. Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to regulate commerce ...
with the Indian Tribes and thus, to this extent, singles
Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation."
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551-552 (1974); see
also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 236 (1974).
Once ratified by Act of Congress, the provisions of the
agreements become law, and like treaties, are the supreme
law of the land. In the absence of any contract between
the Executive Branch and the Colville Confederated
Tribes, Congress could constitutionally have terminated
the northern half of the Colville Indian Reservation on
the same terms and conditions that ultimately appeared
in the 1891 Agreement. Maatz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481
(1973). The decisions in Choate, Perrin, and Dick,
supra, settle that Congress was also constitutionally empowered to do so by legislation ratifying the 1891 Agreement. The legislative ratification constituted the provisions of the 1891 Agreement, including Art. 6, "Laws
of the United States ... in Pursuance" of the Constitution, and the supreme law of the land, just as a contract
by treaty to the same effect, concurred in by the Senate,
would have been a treaty binding upon the State. "Congress has power to regulate commerce with the Indian
tribes, and such power is superior and paramount to the
authority of any State within whose limits are Indian
tribes." Dick v. United States, supra, 208 U.S., at 353.w
10 WRC 37.12.060, which assumes limited jurisdiction over Indians,
expressly providi"S that the law shall not deprive any Indian of
rights secured by agreement.
"Nothmg in th1s chapter . . . shall deprive any Indian or any Indian
tnbe, band, community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded
under federal treaty, agreement, statute, or Executive Order with
respect to Indian land grants, hunting trapping, or fishing or the
control, licensing, or regulation thereof." (Emphasis added.)

T
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III
The opm10n of the State Supreme Court also holds
that in any event the implementing statutes cannot be
construed to render RCW 77.16.020 and RCW 77.16.030
inapplicable to Indian beneficiaries of the Agreement
since the implementing statutes "make no reference to
the provision [Article 6] relied upon by the appellants."
82 Wn. 2d 451, 511 P. 2d 1358. The opinion reasons,
"if it was thought that state regulation but not federal
regulation would constitute an abridgement, an express
provision to that effect should have been inserted, but
only after the consent of the state had been sought and
obtained." 82 Wn. 2d 448, 511 P. 2d 1357. This
reasoning is fatally flawed. The proper inquiry is not
whether the State was or should have been a consenting
party to the 1891 Agreement, but whether appellants
acquired federally guaranteed rights by congressional
ratification of the Agreement. Plainly appellants acquired such rights. Congress exercised its plenary constitutional powers to legislate those federally protected
rights into law in enacting the implementing statutes
that ratified the Agreement. State qualification of the
rights is therefore precluded by force of the Supremacy
Clause, and neither an express provision precluding state
qualifica.tion nor the consent of the Sta.te was required.
On the contrary, if Congress had meant to subject to
state regulation the preserved rights to hunt and fishr
this Court would require that such intent explicitly
appear on the face of the statutes or in their legislative
history. "A congressional determination to terminate
[a reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act
or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history." Maatz v. Arnett, supra, 412 U. S., at
505. Since the Colville Indians rights to hunt and fish
on the ceded northern half of the Colville Reservation

73-717-0PINION
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are part of their larger rights in that ceded half, see
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), 11
we hold that a congressional determination to subject
those rights to qualification by state regulation must
similarly "be expressed on the face of the statutes or be
clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative
history."
But no congressional purpose to subject the preserved
rights to such state regulation is to be found in
either the implementing acts or their legislative history.
Rather, the implementing statutes unqualifiedly, "carr[ied] into effect" and "ratif[ied]" the explicit and
unqualified provision of Art. 6 that "the right to hunt
and fish .
shall not be taken away or in anywise
abridged."

IV
Fina.lly, the opinion of the State Supreme Court construes Art. 6 as merely a promise by the United States
that so long as it retained any ceded land and allowed
others to hunt thereon, Indians would be allowed also to
hunt there. 82 Wn. 2d, at 449-450, 511 P. 2d, at 13571358. But the provision of Art. 6 that the preserved rights
are not exclusive and are to be enjoyed "in common with
all other persons," does not support that interpretation or
affect the Supremacy Clause's preclusion of qualifying
11 Even without an express provision preserving hunting and fishing right8, M onominee agreed that those rights are "part of the larger
rights possessed by the Indians in the lands used and occupied by
them," Federal Indian Law, supra, at 497, citing Op. Act . Sol. M.
28107, and ~urv1ve the termination of the reservation. Thus, there is
no merit in the State's argument that the termination of the northern
half of the Reservation by the 1892 Act without mention of Art. 6
or any other specific preservation of hunting and fishing rights left
the State free to regulate the Indians' exercise of those rights . But
in any event the 1892 Act was only one of the series of statutes
Congress passed to ratify the 1891 Agreement, including Art. 6.
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state regulation. Non-Indians are, of course, not bene~
ficiaries of the preserved rights and the State remains
wholly free to prohibit or regulate non-Indian hunting
and fishing. 'fhe ratifying legislation must be construed
to exempt the Indians' preserved rights from like state
regulation, however, else Congress preserved nothing
which the Indians would not have had without that legislation. For it is impermissible in the absence of explicit
congressional expression, to construe the implementing
acts as "an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word
of the nation for more." United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 380 (1905); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game (Puyallup I), 391 U. S. 392, 397-398 (1968).
Winans involved a treaty that reserved to the Indians
in the area ceded to the United States "the right of taking
fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with
citizens of the Territory." 198 U. S., supra, at 378.
Puyallup considered a provision that "[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations,
is further secured to said Indians, in common with all
citizens of the Territory ...." 391 U. S., supra, at 395.
The Court held that rights so preserved "may, of course,
not be qualified by the State . . . . " 391 U. S., supra,
at 398; 198 U. S., supra, at 384. Article 6 presents an
even stronger case since Congress' ratification of it included the flat prohibition that the right "shall not be
taken away or in anywise abridged."
The canon of construction tha.t this Court has applied
over a century is that the wording of treaties and agreements with the Indians are not to be construed to their
prejudice. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). See also The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
737, 760 (1866); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886); Chnctaw Nations v. United States, 119 U. S. 1,
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28 (1886); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380381 (1905); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912);
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404, 406 n.
2 (1968). That caqon furthers discharge of "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealing with these dependent and sometimes
exploited people," Seminole Nation v. United States, 316
U.S. 286, 296 (1942); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S., supra,
at 236. We have no reason in this case, however, to invoke that canon of construction. The clarity and complete absence of ambiguity in the wording of Art. 6 makes
resort to the canon wholly unnecessary.

v
In Puyallup Tribe v. United States, .~upra, 391 U. S.,
at 398, we held that a.lthough, these rights "may ... not
be qualified by the State, ... the manner of fishing [and
hunting], the size of the take, the restriction of COlflmercial fishing [and hunting] and the like may be regulated
by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not
discriminate against the Indiaps." 391 U. S., supra, at
398. The "appropriate standards" requirement means
that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a
reasonable and necessary conservation measure, Department of Game v. Puyall1tp Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (1973);
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942), and that
its application to the Indians is necessary in the interest
of conservation.
The United States as amicus curiae, invites the Court
to announce that state restrictions "cannot abridge the
Indians' federally protected rights without [the State]
demonstrating a compelling need" in the interest of conservation. Brief of the United States as amicus curiae,
pp. 14-16, We have no occasion in this case to address

,·
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this question. The State of Washington has not argued,
let alone established, that applying the ban on out-ofseason hunting of deer by the Indians on the land in
question is in any way necessary or even useful for the
conservation of deer. See Hunt v. United States, 278
u.s. 96 (1928).12
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington sustaining appellants' convictions is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

12 Appellants apparently claim no right to hunt on fenced private·
property. The State Supreme Court stated:
"Counsel . . . conceded in oral argument that the present owners;
of land in the northern half of the reservation ha.ve the right ta
fence their lamd and exclude hunters. Nevertheless they maintain
that state regulation of the right to hunt is an abridgement of that
right . . . ." 82 Wn. 2d 448., 511 P. 2d 1356.
A claim of entitlement to hunt on fenced or posted private land \
without prior prrmission of the owner would raise serious questions.
not presented in this case ..
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January 23, 1975

Re:

No. 73-717 - Antoine v. Washington

Dear Bill:
I agree with your current circulation in
this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference
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Re:

No. 73-717 - Antoine v. Washington

Dear Bill:
I agree with your current circulation in
this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

February 1 0 , 1 9 7 5

Re:

No. 73-717
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Antoine v. Washington

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
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The Conference
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Re:

No. 73-717, Antoine v. Washington

Dear Bill,
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Please add my name to your dissenting opinion in this case.
Sincerely yours,
,- ; (i
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

.

..

,

.. "·

.·...

.in.prnnt <!fonrl ttf tqt ~ h ~fafts
~agfrittghtn. ~.

<!f.

211p'!~

CHAMBERS OF'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

February 14, 1975

73-717 -Antoine v. Washington

Dear Bill:
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Please join me in your opinion.
Regards :_
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Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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